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This thesis analyzes the growth effects of taxation in a two-sector endogenous
growth model, in which home production is considered as an essential sector
of the economy. By examining the relation between the balanced growth rate
and three types of taxes (labor income taxes, capital income taxes, and con-
sumption taxes) , both analytically and numerically, we show that an increase
in any of the three taxes would distort the economy and thus drag down the
growth rate, regardless of whether home production is present or absent. More-
over, the labor income tax tends to hurt growth the most, the capital income
tax second, and the consumption tax the least. By comparing the cases with
and with home production, we find that when home production is present, the
growth effects of taxation are weaker. It is because that home production has
the buffer nature to absorb the distortion of taxation. We also conduct the
analysis of welfare effects of taxation in a special case. It is shown that in
both cases with and without the home production sector, an increase in any
of the three taxes would reduce welfare. Still the labor income tax reduces
welfare the most, the capital income tax second, and the consumption tax the
least. Furthermore, if the home production sector has an essential share in the
economy, the welfare effects of all three taxes would strengthen.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, many macroeconomic theories have analyzed how tax poli-
cies can influence the economy, and which tax regime is more effective in
promoting economic growth and improving welfare. In particular, many stud-
ies conduct this analysis within the framework of endogenous growth model
(see, e.g., Barro 1990; Rebelo 1991). These literatures have contributed to our
understanding of how taxes affect economic growth and welfare. However, in
most of these studies, home production is not regarded as an important sector
so that it is usually ignored. But in fact home production plays an important
role in any economy. Large amounts of resources are used and numerous goods
and services are produced by the home production sector, and thus the econ-
omy with home production is closer to the real economy. Besides, individuals
make decisions not only in the market sector, but also in the home sector.
Public policies such as taxes influence the allocations of resources within each
of the two sectors and between the two sectors. Hence, incorporating home
production in the growth model may also alter the scenario of tax distortions.
Therefore, it is very important to reconsider taxation issues in an endogenous
growth model with home production.
This thesis focuses on the growth effects of taxation in a two-sector endoge-
nous growth model, in which home production is considered as an essential
sector of the economy. The basic framework is a straightforward extension of
Devereux and Love model (1994, henceforth the DL model). We extend the
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DL model to a case where the economy has a home production sector. As in
the DL model, the economy has two different types of capital: physical capital
and human capital. Physical capital accumulates in the usual way: part of
the market goods is not consumed in current period and becomes new cap-
ital in the following period. Human capital accumulates by using (effective)
labor and physical inputs. Unlike the DL model, the economy we consider has
a home production sector. The home goods are produced by effective labor
supply and market goods. The market goods used in the home production is
subject to the consumption tax, but both effective labor supply in the home
sector and final home produced goods are tax-free. Since the home production
sector is very different from the market production in terms of tax exposure,
introducing this scenario would probably alter how tax distortions work, and
thus strengthens the importance of incorporating home sector in the economy.
Under such assumptions, the market goods can be distributed and used for
different purposes: consumption, physical capital investment, inputs for home
goods production, and inputs for human capital accumulation. Our econ-
omy consists of a continuum of identical and infinitely-lived households. Each
household is endowed with one unit of time in every period, which can be
either spent on leisure or working (labor supply). Labor is used in the fol-
lowing three activities: market production, home production, and education
(human capital accumulation). Furthermore, three types of taxes are consid-
ered in this thesis: consumption tax, labor income tax, and capital income tax.
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The purposes of the thesis are (1) to obtain the balanced growth rate, and
explore taxation effects on the balanced growth rate in the general model; and
(2) to understand the transitional dynamics of the economy in a special case
(when the utility function is in logarithm form); and (3) to compute the wel-
fare function in special case, and investigate the taxation effects on welfare.
The main results of this thesis are obtained from numerical simulations. We
first simulate the benchmark economy. Then we vary the rate of each tax to
see how the growth rate and welfare respond to the changes in these taxes.
This analysis can help us to understand the growth and welfare effects of tax-
ation. The main results can be summarized as follows: (1) All the three types
of taxes have negative effects on the growth rate in steady state; (2) For equal
percentage changes, in terms of the magnitudes of the negative effects, the la-
bor income tax reduces the growth rate most, followed by capital income tax,
and consumption tax only reduces the growth rate a little. (3) If the home
production sector is absent from the model (by setting the contribution of
home produced goods to utility to a number close to zero), the growth rate is
more responsive to any type of taxes, meaning that for each tax, it drags down
the growth rate more without a home production sector. (4) In the special
case, all three types of taxes reduce welfare: the labor income tax reduces wel-
fare most, the capital income tax second, and the consumption tax least. (5) If
home production is absent, these taxes have smaller negative effects on welfare.
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Without home production, the main results from our model would be similar
to those in the literatures. The new findings of the thesis (such as tax effects on
growth and welfare with home production, and the comparisons of tax effects
between the scenarios with and without the home production) contribute to
the literatures by enhancing our understanding of how taxes affect growth and
welfare in an economy with home production.
The thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 is a literature review, summarizing
main conclusions from previous studies. Section 3 constructs and develops a
basic two-sector endogenous growth model with home production. Section 4
analytically investigates the relationship between growth and taxes. Section 5
considers a special case in which both the growth rate and welfare functions are
derived. The growth rate and welfare functions apply to both the steady state
and transitional periods of the economy. In Section 6, numerical simulations
are conducted to illustrate the taxation effects on growth and welfare. The
conclusions and policy implications are in Section 7.
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2 Literature Review
There are a large number of literatures studying on taxation and economic
growth. A well-cited study is conducted by King and Rebelo (1990). In their
thesis, the authors conclude that, in the two-sector endogenous growth model,
national policies, such as taxation policies, can affect long-run growth rates, as
well as aggregate welfare. Calibrating the model using US data, the authors
show that taxes can easily shut down the growth process, leading to devel-
opment traps in which countries stagnate or even regress for lengthy periods.
Some similar results are obtained by Jones et al (1991), in which they examine
three separate models of growth. The results accord with the findings in King
and Rebelo (1990), stating that regardless of the elasticity of labor supply and
whether the government expenditure is taken as exogenous or endogenous, the
growth and welfare effects are both large.
Devereux and Love (1994) have extended the analysis in this topic. In their
research, they set up a two-sector model of endogenous growth arising from
accumulation of both physical and human capital. Analytically solving the
balanced growth rate, they show that all three types of taxes (i.e., consump-
tion tax, labor income tax, and capital income) have negative effects on the
balanced growth rate. Among them, labor income tax reduces the growth rate
most, capital income tax second, and consumption tax least. These results
are also shown by numerical calibrations that use the US data. Accordingly,
based on the numerical results, the dynamic adjustment paths of model’s vari-
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ables are illustrated graphically in order to show how these variables respond
to the changes in taxes and deviate from the balanced growth paths. And it
also examines the effects of taxes on the intersectoral allocations of resources,
showing that: ”wage and consumption taxes have a negligible effect on inter-
sectoral allocation, while capital taxes lead to a sharp reallocation of factors
away from current investment in physical capital and towards investment in
human capital.” At last, they compute the welfare costs of various tax policies.
The results turn out that when any one of the three taxes increases, the wel-
fare cost will be incurred. With transitional effects, capital income tax has the
strongest effect on welfare, and thus it is the most ineffective form of taxation.
However, none of these three studies mentioned above has considered the home
production sector in the analysis. Some other studies, by contrast, have taken
the home production into account, by realizing that home production is usually
easy to be ignored, but in fact very crucial both empirically and theoretically.
The empirical importance of home production is documented by Benhabib and
Rogerson (1991), who argue that an average married couple spends 33 percent
of their discretionary time working in the market and 28 percent, only slightly
less, working at home. Besides, the theoretical importance of home production
is also explained by Sandmo (1990). It is stated in his study that including
home production may give more structure to the model of consumer behavior,
and thus alter the optimal tax-regime, resource allocation path, and economic
interpretation of optimum tax structure. The household taxation has implica-
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tions for overall production efficiency, so when home production is included,
the mechanism that income and consumption taxes cause production ineffi-
ciencies may alter.
Moreover, some recent studies consider economies with home production, such
as Zhang, Zeng, Davies and McDonald (2008), in which the authors incorpo-
rate home production into the neoclassical model with taxes imposed on home
investment, concluding that the government should tax home investment for
home production at the same rate it taxes private market consumption in order
to map the decentralized case into the social planner’s solution. Such finding
inspires our thesis in terms that when formulating the tax-regime, we choose




The basic model follows the DL model closely. We extend the DL model by
considering the role of home production.
3.1 Final Good Production
Final goods are produced both in the market and at home. In the market,




1−α, 0 < α < 1 (1)
where
l1t: labor used in market goods production at time t;
Ht: human capital at time t;
Kt: physical capital at time t;
Yt: the output of market goods at time t.
(The market production function is continuous, increasing, and quasi-concave
in Kt and l1t.)
At home, goods are produced by effective labor and market goods bought from




1−φ, 0 < φ < 1 (2)
where
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l2t: labor used in home goods production at time t;
Cht: home goods produced and consumed at time t (for home sector, here we
assume the agent consumes all that he produces).
(The home production function is continuous, increasing and quasi-concave in
Qt and l2t.)
3.2 Human and Physical Capital Accumulation
Both human and physical capital can be accumulated in our model. Human
capital is accumulated by using markets goods and effective labor. This sector




1−θ + (1− δH)Ht, 0 < θ < 1, 0 < δ < 1 (3)
where
D: technology parameter in human capital accumulation, representing the ef-
ficiency in human capital accumulation sector;
l3t: labor used in education at time t;
Ht+1: human capital level at time t+1;
Et: market goods invested in education at time t;
δH : the depreciation rate of human capital;
Htl3t indicates that human capital is embodied in labor.
Physical capital is accumulated by delaying consumption of market goods,
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after excluding the proportion invested into home production and education:
Cmt +Qt + Et +Kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)Kt (4)
(Cmt denotes consumption of market goods, and δ denotes the depreciation
rate of physical capital. This equation is also known as the feasibility condi-
tion.)
3.3 Preferences
There is one representative agent living in this economy with preferences over





βtu(Cmt, Cht, 1− Lt)
where





1− σ ,when σ ≥ 0, σ 6= 1
u(Cmt, Cht, 1− Lt) = ln [CγmtCht(1− Lt)1−γ−],when σ = 1
Agent can chose among savings, consumption of different goods, and time
distribution but must face the following constraint:
Kt+1+(1+τc)(Cmt+Qt) = (1−τl)ωtHtl1t+(1−τk)rtKt+(1−δ)Kt−(1−s)Et+Tt
(5)
where τc, τl and τk are the tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital
income, respectively. All of them are time-invariant. is the exogenous subsidy
10
given to education by government,ωt is the wage rate, rt is the interest rate,
and Tt is the lump-sum transfer.
The sum of l1t, l2tandl3t is therefore the total hours supplied to working. By
assuming the agent has one unit of time endowment in every period, and let-
ting l1t + l2t + l3t = Lt, the leisure is 1− Lt.
4. Competitive Equilibrium: Definition
A competitive equilibrium for the economy constructed above is composed
of the sequences {Cmt, Cht, Qt, Et, Kt, Ht, l1t, l2t, l3t, ωt, rt, τc, τl, τk, s} for t =
1, 2, . . ., which satisfy the following conditions:
A. Consumer utility maximization
Maximizing utility function subject to (3) and (5)
Cmt ≥ 0, Cht ≥ 0, l1t + l2t + l3t = Lt ≤ 1
H0, K0 are given.








Where ωt is the real wage per unit of human capital.
C.Government budget constraint holds:
τc(Cmt +Qt) + τlωtHtl1t + τkrtKt = sEt + Tt
D.Market clearing: Cmt +Qt + Et +Kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)Kt
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4 Growth Effects of Taxation
4.1 Competitive Equilibrium: Characterization
To investigate the relationship between growth rate and taxes, we first char-
acterize the competitive equilibrium. The Lagrangian function for the repre-









1− σ + λt[(1− τl)ωtHtl1t + (1− τk)rtKt + (1− δ)Kt




1−θ + (1− δH)Ht −Ht+1]}
























Kt : λt[(1− τk)rt + 1− δ] = λt−1 (9)
Et : λt(1− s) = ΩtDEθ−1t θ(Htl3t)1−θ (10)








ht(1− Lt)1−γ−]−σCht(1− Lt)1−γ−γCγ−1mt = λt(1 + τc) (12)
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Ht : λt(1− τl)ωtl1t + νtBQφt (1− φ)(Htl2t)−φl2t + ΩtDEθt (1− θ)(Htl3t)−θl3t






ht(1− Lt)1−γ−]−σCγmt(1− Lt)1−γ−C−1ht = νt (14)
From (6) and (12), we have




Equation (15) represents the trade-off between market goods consumption and
leisure: the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution between market goods




after adjustment for consumption tax and labor income tax (RHS).
From (7),(11) and (12), we obtain





Equation (16) represents the trade-off between market goods consumption,
leisure and home goods consumption: the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween market goods consumption and leisure (LHS) equalizes with the marginal
productivity of market goods used in home production (RHS). This equation
also indicates that the home sector directly competes with the market sector
by sharing the goods and time resources. As explained in Kleven et al (2000),
the addition of the home sector may distort consumer’s demand for market-
produced goods and services, and hence the optimal tax policy must adjust
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accordingly.
Combining (8), (10)and (12), we have





Equation (17) represents the trade-off between market goods consumption,
leisure and education: the marginal rate of substitution between market goods
consumption and leisure (LHS) equalizes with the marginal productivity of
market goods invested in education after the adjustment of consumption tax
and government subsidy on education.
Moreover, equations (15)-(17) state that for an optimal intersectional alloca-
tion of market goods and labor supply, the marginal rates of technical substi-
tution between factors (after adjustment of taxes and subsidies) must be equal
across sectors.
Update (12)for one period, and let [CγmtC

ht(1 − Lt)1−γ−]1−σ = Cˆt. Together






[1− δ + αYt+1(1− τk)
Kt+1
] (18)
This is the optimal accumulation path for physical capital as a function of
its return rate. From (15)-(18), it is clear that all three forms of taxes have
independent effects on the economy:
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(1) Similar to the DL model, by (15), the consumption tax drives a wedge
between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and the
real wage. Furthermore, from (16) the consumption tax displays its distortion
by relocating the resources between producing market goods and enhancing
education.
(2) By (15), the labor income tax has the first consumption tax effect as well.
And it also distorts the economy by reallocating resources and affecting returns
to human capital accumulation through (15) and (17).
(3) A capital income tax undermines growth by affecting the intertemporal
incentive to invest. As in Sergio Rebelo (1991), if the capital income tax in-
creases, the rate of return to the investment activities will be lower, resulting
in a permanent decline in the rates of capital accumulation and growth.












(1− θ)[Ht+1 − (1− δH)Ht]/Htl3t (20)
where Zt is the marginal product of human capital used in the market goods
production divided by the marginal product of human capital used in the home
production, and Mt is the marginal product of human capital used in the home
production divided by marginal product of human capital used in the educa-
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tion, all after adjustments for taxes.






(1− θ)[Ht+2 − (1− δH)Ht+1]
Ht+1













(1− α)(1− τl)Yt+1 + Zt+1(1− φ)Cht+1
Ht+1
+




A competitive equilibrium is characterized by equations (15)-(18) and (22).
4.2 Balanced Growth Rate
In order to obtain the balanced growth rate in this two-sector economy, we fol-
low Devereux and Love (1994) to derive two equations concerning the growth
rate and total labor supply. The first equation can be obtained from the above
equilibrium conditions with the additional assumptions that Zt = Zt+1 and
Mt = Mt+1 which mean that the after-tax marginal productivity of human
capital used in all sectors grow at the same rate. This assumption reflects the
property of balance growth. In fact, in the steady state, the allocation of labor
supply is constant across periods, and other variables grow at a constant rate.
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We substitute Z and M into (22) to get the following:
1− δ + (1− τk)AαK1−αt+1 (Ht+1l1t+1)1−α =




Now we impose the steady state conditions such that all variables grow at
constant rates. Moreover, for simplicity, we set δ = δH (both physical and
human capital depreciate at the same rate), then (23) leads to
D(1− θ)EθL
Hθlθ3
= (1− τk)AαKα−1(Hl1)1−α (24)




1−α+αθ (1− θ) (1−α)(1−θ)1−α+αθ A θ1−α+αθ θ θ(1−α)1−α+αθ (1− s)−θ(1−α)1−α+αθ α αθ1−α+αθ (1− α) θ(1−α)1−α+αθ
× (1− τl)
θ(1−α)



















= 1 + g, we can rewrite (24)as














Therefore, all taxes and subsidy have negative effects on the growth rate.
There is a positive relationship between total labor supply and the growth
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rate. Holding the total labor supply constant, the tax effect of labor income
tax dominates that of capital income tax if α < 1/2; On the contrary, the tax
effect of capital income tax dominates that of labor income tax if α > 1/2;
If α = 1/2, labor and capital income tax have exactly the same effect on the
growth rate.
Now we derive the other equation relating the balanced growth rate to total
labor supply. Together with (25), these two relationships implicitly determine
the balanced growth rate.





β(g + δ)(1− θ)
(1 + g)1−(γ+)(1−σ) − β(1− δ)L ≡ Φ(g)L (26)
Φ is the is the share of labor supply used in the human capital accumulation.
It can be either increasing or decreasing in g: when σ is small, Φ′(g) > 0, Φ
is increasing in g; when σ is sufficiently large, Φ′(g) < 0, then Φ is decreasing
in g. This property follows the idea in DL model: if the preference curvature
is high, a rise in the growth rate will lead to a greater proportional rise in the
real rate of return.
From (2) (3) and (14), we have
l2 =
(1− φ)
1− γ − (1− L) (27)
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l1 = L− l2 − l3 = (1 + (1− φ)
1− γ −  − Φ)L−
(1− φ)
1− γ −  (28)







− (g + δ)Kt
Yt
(29)





(1 + g)1−(γ+)(1−σ) − β(1− δ) ≡ Π(g) (30)






, then by (26)-(30)we




Γ + 1 + (1−τk)α
1−θ Φ







where Γ ≡ (1−τl)(1−α)(γ+φ)+(1−φ)(1+τc)
(1−γ−)(1+τc)
Equation (31) is the second relationship between balanced growth rate and
total labor supply. Therefore, the implicit solution for balanced growth rate is
given by (25),(26),(31) and equation of Γ. Graphically, these relationships are
illustrated in the graphs below. There are two possible cases depending on the
relationship between g and L given by equation (33): (i) g is increasing in L,
and (ii) g is decreasing in L.
From (26)we know that g must be positively related to L, so in either case (26)
gives an upward-sloping curve. For (31), it is unclear whether g is increasing
or decreasing in L, and how many times the curve intersects with the other
curve given by (26). However, it is reasonable to assume that the growth rate
given by (31) is either strictly increasing or decreasing L, so there exists a
19
Figure 1: Figure 1
unique solution of g. This assumption holds true under our parameterizations
in Section 6.
4.3 Growth Effect of Taxation
In the general case, unfortunately, it is not straightforward to analytically
figure out the relationship between the balanced growth rate and various taxes,
since the explicit solution of the growth rate cannot be obtained. However, we
can still analyze how taxes affect the growth rate in special case, where σ = 1
and δ = 1. Should this condition hold true, we have Φ = β(1− θ). Substitute
this new expression into equation (31) and denote the new total labor supply
as L′:
L′ =[Γ− αβ(1− φ)(1− τk)
1− γ −  ]/[Γ + 1 + αβ
2(1− θ)(1− τk)
− αβ(1− τk)− αβ(1− φ)(1− τk)
1− γ −  −
β(1− τl)(1− α)θ
1− s − β(1− θ)]
(32)
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Substituting L′ into (25) and differentiating it with respect to taxes, we can see







(i)The sign of ∂g
∂τc
:
The sign of this derivative is determined as follows:
Sign[ ∂g
∂τc
] = Sign[(numerator of L′-denominator of L′) (1−τl)(1−α)(γ+φ)
(1−γ−)(1+τc)2 ]. Since
0 < L′ < 1, hence (numerator of L′-denominator of L′)< 0. Together with
(1−τl)(1−α)(γ+φ)
(1−γ−)(1+τc)2 > 0, we can achieve that
∂g
∂τc
< 0 Hence the growth rate is
negatively related to the consumption tax.
(ii) The sign of ∂g
∂τk
:






[1− α(1− θ)](1− τk)
− (αβ(1− α)
[1− α(1− θ](1− γ − )(L′numerator)(L′denominator)
× {(1− τl)(1− α)(γ + φ)[1− β(1− θ)]
1 + τc
+
βθ(1− τl)(1− α)(1− φ)
1− s }
Now we assume that g > 0. Given the range of each parameter’s value, the
following inequalities hold:
αθ
[1− α(1− θ)](1− τk) > 0
(αβ(1− α)
[1− α(1− θ](1− γ − )(L′numerator)(L′denominator) > 0
(1− τl)(1− α)(γ + φ)[1− β(1− θ)]
1 + τc
+
βθ(1− τl)(1− α)(1− φ)
1− s > 0
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Hence it is trivial to show that ∂g
∂τk
< 0. In other words, the growth rate is
negatively related to the capital income tax.











[1− α(1− θ)](1− τl)
+
(1− α2)
[1− α(1− θ](1− γ − )(1 + τc)(L′numerator)(L′denominator)
× {[αβ(1− τk)− αβ2(1− τk)(1− θ) + β(1− θ)− 1](γ + φ)
− βθ(1− φ)(1 + τc) + αβ
2θ(1− φ)(1− τk)(1 + τc)
1− s }
The sign of the RHS of the above equation is not clear. However, it is most
likely to be negative under reasonable parameterizations. For example, if g =
0.3, β = 0.998, α = φ = θ = 0.36, γ = 0.23,  = 0.22, τl = τk = s = 0.2, τc = 0,
together with σ = 1 and δ = 1, (This parameterization is the same as that in
Section 6, Part 1. This will be discussed in details later) then RHS = −0.983,
so ∂g
∂τl
is negative. Therefore, the growth rate is negatively related to labor
income tax too. In conclusion, all three types of taxes have negative effects on
the balanced growth rate.
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5 A Special Case (σ = 1)
5.1 Competitive Equilibrium When σ = 1
The objective of this subsection is to analytically solve the model under the
assumption that σ = 1. In this special case, we can obtain the competitive
equilibrium solutions explicitly.




{βt[γ lnCmt +  lnCht + (1− γ − ) ln 1− Lt] + λt[(1− τl)ωtHtl1t




1−φ − Cht] + Ωt[DEθt (Htl3t)1−θ + (1− δH)Ht −Ht+1]}
This first order conditions are:
l1t :
βt(1− γ − )
1− Lt = λt(1− τl)ωtHt (33)
l2t :
βt(1− γ − )




t (1− φ)l−φ2t (34)
l3t :
βt(1− γ − )













Kt : λt[(1− τk)rt + 1− δ] = λt−1 (38)
Et : λt(1− s) = ΩtDEθ−1t θ(Htl3t)1−θ (39)





Ht : λt(1− τl)ωtl1t + νtBQφt (1− φ)(Htl2t)−φl2t + ΩtDEθt (1− θ)(Htl3t)−θl3t
+(1− δH)Ωt = Ωt−1
(41)
Now we assume that δ = δH = 1, which means all capitals fully depreciate at
the end of each period. Furthermore, we employ the conditions that all phys-





, for t = 1, 2, . . . ;X denotes each of the physical variables ).
By feasibility condition and equations (33)-(41), the solution is as below:
Cmt =
[1− αβ(1− τk)]γ(1− s)[1− β(1− θ)]− γβθ(1− τl)(1− α)







βγθ(1− τl)(1− α) + βθ(1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC
γ(1− s)[1− β(1− θ)] Yt ≡ ΥEYt (44)
Kt+1 = βα(1− τk)Yt ≡ ΥKYt (45)
(42)-(45) show that Cmt, Qt, Et and Kt+1 are all proportional to Yt. Moreover,
by analyzing those coefficients from (42) to (45), we can figure out how tax














these relations display that an increase in τk or τc decreases the return rate
to investing and working in the market, and makes both consumption of mar-
ket goods (Cmt) and home investment (Qt) relatively cheaper. Therefore, the
agent would have less incentive to invest and work in the market, and more
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incentive to consuming market goods and producing home goods. As for τc
which imposes on both market goods consumption and home investment, if τc
increases, both Cmt and Qt becomes relatively more expensive, so the agent
would have less incentive to consuming market goods and investing in home
production, hence Cmt and Qt decrease.
For this reason, taxes may force market goods consumption and home invest-
ment away from its best level and reset the allocation of factor resources across
sectors, and therefore probably worsen the growth rate and welfare. This tax
effect on intersectoral allocation is also captured by the equation (44) and (45).













1− γ −  (48)
l3t
1− Lt =
βγ(1− θ)(1− τl)(1− α) + β(1− θ)(1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC
(1− γ − )[1− β(1− θ)](1 + τc)ΥC (49)
These three equations above indicate how labor supply is distributed across
three productions against leisure. Take home sector as an example, labor sup-
ply in home production against leisure in equation (48) is positively related to
labor’s productivity in home sector and agent’s preference on home produced
goods, and negatively related to agent’s preference on leisure. The intuition is
simple here: if home production becomes more efficient in labor, or the agent
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prefers home produced goods or devalues leisure, more time would be spent on
home production with less leisure consumption.
Taxes also play an important role in time-distribution. Take equation (46)
as an example. Together with ∂ΥC
∂τc
> 0, when τl increases, return to market-
labor-supply reduces, so the agent has less incentive to work in the market,
and would rather choose to spend more time in home production. As a result,
l1t will probably decrease and l2t will probably decrease. For this reason, we
can argue that taxes can force the labor supply in each sector to deviate from
its best level, and thus distort the economy and harm the growth rate.
The above derivations lead to:
Lt =[γ(1− τl)(1− α) + (1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC ]/{γ(1− τl)(1− α)
+ (1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC + (1− γ − )[1− β(1− θ)](1 + τc)ΥC}
(50)
l1t = l1 ={γ[1− β(1− θ)](1− τl)(1− α)}/{γ(1− τl)(1− α)
+ (1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC + (1− γ − )[1− β(1− θ)](1 + τc)ΥC}
(51)
l2t = l2 ={[1− β(1− θ)](1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC}/{γ(1− τl)(1− α)
+ (1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC + (1− γ − )[1− β(1− θ)](1 + τc)ΥC}
(52)
l3t = l3 ={β(1− θ)[γ(1− τl)(1− α) + (1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC ]}/{γ(1− τl)(1− α)
+ (1− φ)(1 + τc)ΥC + (1− γ − )[1− β(1− θ)](1 + τc)ΥC}
(53)
As all parameters, including ΥC , are constant in time allocation variables,
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the labor supply in each sector and leisure are thus time-invariant during tran-
sitional periods. This property also holds when the economy reaches steady
state.
5.2 Growth Rate When σ = 1
First we try to solve the growth rates during transitional periods. For simplic-
























1 , divide both sides of (45) by Kt, equation (45)can be
rewritten as:
kt+1 = αβA(1− τk)l1−α1 h1−αt (56)






use (15)-(17) and (56) to manipulate it to get:
Et
Ht
= αβA(1− τk)l1−α1 h−αt Ψ (57)






Plug (57) into (55) to achieve:
ht+1 = A
θ−1Dαθ−1βθ(1−θ)(1−τk)θ−1l(θ−1)(1−α)1 l−θ3 LΨθhα(1−θ)t ≡ h¯hα(1−θ)t (58)
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)(1 − α), plug (56) and (59) into it to achieve
the growth rate in transitional period t:






All three taxes can influence the growth rate in transitional period through
l1 and h¯ . However none of these growth effects of taxation are easy to see
analytically.
Then we try to solve the growth rate in steady state. Since
lim
t→∞
(1 + gt) = αβA(1− τk)l1−α1 h¯
1−α
1−α(1−θ) (61)
In the steady state, the growth rate is constant, which means all physical vari-
ables grow at a constant rate. Again, all three taxes may affect the growth
rate through l1 and h¯, but unfortunately it is not easy to analytically show
these growth effects of taxation.
5.3 Welfare Under σ = 1
The welfare at time t is the summation of discounting utilities of every period




βj[γ lnCmt+j +  lnCht+j + (1− γ − ) ln (1− L)] (62)
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so if we set t = 0, given H0 and K0, the result of U0 is the total welfare sum-
mation which starts from the time t = 0, covering both transitional and steady
state periods. In order to achieve it, some intermediate manipulations need to
be done first.
Recall some previous results: Cmt = ΥCYt and Kt+1 = αβ(1− τk)Yt. Rewrite












Update (63) by one period and plug Kt+1 = αβ(1− τk)Yt into:
Yt+1 = Aαβ(1− τk)l1−α1 h1−αt+1 Yt (64)
Take logarithm on both sides of equation (64) and update it to time t+ j:
lnYt+j = j lnAαβ(1− τk)l1−α1 + (1− α)
j∑
i=1
lnht+i + lnYt (65)
Update equation (58) to time t+ i
lnht+i =
1− αi(1− θ)i
1− α(1− θ) ln h¯+ α
i(1− θ)i lnht (66)





1− α(1− θ) −
α(1− θ)− αj+1(1− θ)j+1
(1− α(1− θ))2 ] ln h¯
+
α(1− θ)− αj+1(1− θ)j+1
1− α(1− θ) lnht
(67)





















Aφ−1Bφφ(1− φ)1−φ(1 + τc)1−φΥC lα(1−φ)1
γ(1− τl)1−φ(1− α)1−φ h
α(1−φ)
t ≡ ηhα(1−φ)t (68)
Then we try to achieve the explicit solution of welfare. Update (42) and (68)
to time t+ j and plug into (62):
Ut =
1
























(1− β)(1− α(1− θ)) −
1
(1− αβ(1− θ))(1− α(1− θ)) ] ln h¯
+
1





























1− α(1− θ) −
α(1− θ)− αj+1(1− θ)j+1





α(1− θ)− αj+1(1− θ)j+1
1− α(1− θ) lnht
=
β





+ (1− α)[ β
(1− β)2(1− α(1− θ)) −
α(1− θ)
(1− β)(1− α(1− θ))2
+
α(1− θ)
(1− αβ(1− θ))(1− α(1− θ))2 ] ln h¯
+ (1− α)[ α(1− θ)
(1− β)(1− α(1− θ)) −
α(1− θ)
(1− αβ(1− θ))(1− α(1− θ)) ] lnht
(71)
Plug (63),(70) and (71) into (69),rearrange and set t = 0:
U0 =
γ ln ΥC +  ln η + (1− γ − ) ln (1− L)
1− β +
(γ + )β







1 K0 + [
β(γ + )(1− α)
(1− β)2(1− α(1− θ))
− α(1− θ)(γ + )(1− α)
(1− β)(1− α(1− θ))2 +
α(1− θ)(γ + )(1− α)
(1− αβ(1− θ))(1− α(1− θ))2
+
α(1− φ)
(1− β)(1− α(1− θ)) −
α(1− φ)
(1− αβ(1− θ))(1− α(1− θ)) ] ln h¯
+ [
α(1− θ)(γ + )(1− α)
(1− β)(1− α(1− θ)) −
α(1− θ)(γ + )(1− α)
(1− αβ(1− θ))(1− α(1− θ))
+
α(1− φ)
(1− αβ(1− θ)) +
(γ + )(1− α)
1− β ] lnh0
(72)
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Given H0 and K0, we can compute the total welfare starting from the initial
period of the economy. It not only covers the transitional periods, but the
steady state periods as well. Since the welfare is a function of taxes, all of
these three taxes are probable to affect the welfare level. However, it is not
easy to tell these relations analytically. Some numerical example is used to
discover these relations in the next section. But the intuition why taxes can
affect welfare may be clarified that: the factor ratio employed in production
(ht = Ht/Kt) is affected by all three taxes, and all three taxes can cause the
distortion that deviates the factor ratio from its most efficient values. It may
be reason why taxes are likely to drag down the welfare level. This idea accords
with the general findings from previous research work such as L. E. Jones et
al (1993), which concludes that taxes have negative effect on welfare.
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6 Numerical Examples
In this section, rather than calibrate to any specific economy, we provide some
numerical examples to analyze the growth effects of taxation in the steady state
in general case, and the welfare effects of taxation in special case. For sure
we cannot expect that all the parameter values can extremely precisely reflect
the real economy, since some important information including the nature of
human capital accumulation is lacking and the complexity of the real world
makes some of the parameter values hard to determine, but we can still conduct
this numerical analysis by using some of the key parameter values from King
and Rebelo (1990)and Devereux and Love (1994).
6.1 Growth Effects of Taxation
We need to choose the values of the following parameters: (1) preference pa-
rameters: β, γ,  and σ; (2) technology parameters:A,B,D, α, φ, θ, δ and δH ;
(3) government policy parameters:τc, τl, τk and s. We first choose the values of
the above parameters to form a benchmark economy, and then vary the val-
ues of these parameters, especially the government policies, to see how taxes
influence the steady state growth rate.
Following Devereux and Love (1994), we choose the (physical) capital shares
in all three productions to be 0.36, namely α = φ = θ = 0.36. By doing this,
we set 1−θ = 0.64 following the understanding of human capital technology in
King and Rebelo (1990). We also assume that the depreciation rates for both
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types of capital are the same and equal to 10%. For the government policy
parameters, we assume that there is no consumption tax, and the labor income
tax, capital income tax, and subsidy rates are all equal to 20%.
Now the remaining task is to choose the values of β, γ, , σ, A,B and D. First
of all, we choose a growth rate of 3% per annum. It follows the average world
GDP growth rate in the last decade. Then A, B and D can be set as equal to
each other, assuming that all sectors have the same technology productivity,
and the exact value of A, B and D is fixed to produce a growth rate equal
to 3% annually. Secondly, the discounting factor β is set at 0.998; Thirdly,
the values of the other parameters should be set so as to satisfy the follow-
ing conditions: (1) The agent spends 35% of his time in producing market
and home goods, another 35% in all the activities related to education (for-
mal and informal education as well as self-learning). This assumption gives us
l1 + l2 = 0.35, l3 = 0.35 and L = 0.7, and therefore (1− L) = 0.3 and Φ = 0.5.
It again follows Devereux and Love (1994), in which it is stated that half of
the total labor supply is used in the education. (2) σ = 3.44. This assumption
follows the previous literatures which states that the value of should between
2 and 4.
Condition (1) and (2) are satisfied by setting γ +  = 0.45 following equation
(26). Using equation (31) we can achieve that γ = 0.23 and  = 0.22. Finally,
by equation (25), we can pin down the values for A, B and D, which all equal
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to 0.625.
In summary, the values of the parameters for the benchmark economy are:
β = 0.998, γ = 0.23,  = 0.22, σ = 3.44, A = B = D = 0.625, α = φ = θ =
0.36, δ = δH = 0.1, τl = τk = s = 0.2 and τc = 0
The steady-state growth rate and time allocation in the benchmark economy
are: g = 0.03, l1 + l2 = 0.35 and l3 = 0.35
Using the above benchmark parameter values, we first plot equation (25) and
(31) in Figure 2. For (25), when L = 0, g = −5%; when L = 0.7, g = 3.1%, and
g is increasing in L. For (31), when L = 0, g = −4.6%, when L = 0.7, g = 3%.
Figure 2: Figure 2
In the following part, we vary the rates of taxes to see how the growth rate
responses. The following tables show the growth effects of taxation.
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Table 1: Growth Effects of Taxes (With Home Production)
β = 0.998, γ = 0.23,  = 0.22, σ = 3.44, A = B = D = 0.625
α = φ = θ = 0.36, δ = δH = 0.1, s = 0.2
g L l3 l2 l1
τc = 0, τl = 0.2.τk = 0.2 0.0300 0.7021 0.3516 0.0763 0.2742
τc = 0, τl = 0.2, τk = 0 0.0341 0.7108 0.3485 0.0740 0.2883
τc = 0, τl = 0, τk = 0.2 0.0395 0.7421 0.3546 0.0660 0.3215
τc = 0.2, τl = 0.2, τk = 0.2 0.0287 0.6848 0.3454 0.0807 0.2587
Table 1 shows the responses of the growth rate to changes in the taxes in an
economy with home production. The first row of the table gives the equilib-
rium steady state growth rate and allocation of labor supply in the benchmark
case. Notice here the subsidy is exogenous and fixed at 0.2, meaning that the
lump-sum transfer would automatically adjust itself to balance the consumer
and government budget constraints. In the subsequent rows, the value of each
tax rate is varied so as to distinguish the growth effects of each tax from one
another.
The numerical results are very similar to those in the DL model. First, all
the three taxes reduce the growth rate. Intuitively, it is because that all the
three taxes are distortionary, so an increase in any of them would have a sub-
stitution effect. More specifically, we can see from equation (15) that both τc
and τl can undermine the growth rate by driving a wedge between marginal
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rate of substitution of market goods consumption versus leisure and real wage.
Besides, if equalizing the right-hand sides of equations (15) and (16), it can be
seen that both τc and τl affect the returns to home production by distorting
the resource allocation of production factors. Also, if equalizing the right-hand
sides of equations (15) and (17), it can be seen that τl affects the return to
education by distorting resource allocation between different sectors. For τk,
noticing the equation (18), the capital income tax influences the intertemporal
incentive to invest.
Like Devereux and Love (1994), we are also interested in the growth effects of
taxation under the scenario without home production.
Table 2: Growth Effects of Taxes (Without Home Production)
β = 0.998, γ = 0.45,  = 0, σ = 3.46, A = B = D = 0.644
α = φ = θ = 0.36, δ = δH = 0.1, s = 0.2
g L l3 l2 l1
τc = 0, τl = 0.2.τk = 0.2 0.0300 0.6688 0.3344 0 0.3344
τc = 0, τl = 0.2, τk = 0 0.0343 0.6829 0.3399 0 0.3490
τc = 0, τl = 0, τk = 0.2 0.0406 0.7238 0.3434 0 0.3804
τc = 0.2, τl = 0.2, τk = 0.2 0.0273 0.6390 0.3243 0 0.3147
Table 2 shows the equilibrium results in an economy without home production
(by setting  = 0). And we also alter the values of σ and A = B = D so as
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to peg the benchmark growth rate at 3%. But the rest parameters have the
same values as they do in Table 1.
Similar to Table 1, without home production, all the three taxes still reduce
the growth rate. The reasons why these taxes have negative effects on growth
are the same as mentioned above. In Devereux and Love (1994), an increase
in labor income tax from 0 to 0.2 reduces the growth rate by 25.9%. In this
thesis, it would reduce the growth rate by 26%, which is almost the same as
it is in Devereux and Love (1994). Similarly, an increase in capital income tax
from 0 to 0.2 reduces growth rate by 13% in Devereux and Love (1994) and by
12.5% in this thesis. Although this thesis has key differences from Devereux
and Love (1994) in terms of introducing the home production into the model,
when home production is eliminated, the results for growth effects of taxation
are surprisingly similar.
However, the magnitudes of the growth effects of taxes are different between
the two cases with and without home production.
Table 3: Growth Effects of Taxes: The Role of Home Production
g’s change g’s change
with home production without home production
τl : 0→ 0.2 −24% −26%
τk : 0→ 0.2 −12% −12.5%
τc : 0→ 0.2 −4.3% −9%
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Table 3 shows that τl reduces the growth rate most, τk the second, and τc the
least,for both cases with and without home production. The reason for such
sequence can be explained by the way we parameterize the (physical) capital
shares in all sectors (namely α = φ = θ = 0.36). Under such framework,
effective labor supply shares are set at 0.64 in all three sectors. As a result,
the effective labor supplies are relatively more important in productions than
(physical) capitals. Hence τl, which directly affects the effective labor supplies,
is more likely to affect the growth rate more severely than τk. For τc, it only
affects the growth rate through the consumption-leisure trade-off mechanism,
which leaves the factor accumulation process untouched, hence growth rate
may decline with the slightest magnitude when τc increases.
Comparing the scenarios with and without home production, apparently when
home production is absent, all the three taxes have larger negative effects on
the growth rate. Intuitively, home production plays an important role as a
buffer to absorb the distortions of the taxes, leading to a smaller reduction
in the growth rate given the fact that home production is only subject to the
consumption tax which has the weakest negative effect on the growth rate.
6.2 Welfare Effects of Taxation
The following numerical examples are based on the analytical results of welfare
in Section 5, where σ, δ and δH are set to be 1.
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We first choose the values of the parameters for the benchmark economy.
For simplicity, this time we set all policy parameters equal to 0, namely
τc = τl = τk = s = 0. β, α, φ, θ are all set as the same in the last section. In the
scenario with home production, we set γ,  the same value in the last section,
but in the scenario without home production, we chose γ = 0.449,  = 0.001.
Here we do not set  = 0 as we do previously to eliminate home sector, because
otherwise some variables will be undefined. Again we try to pin down a growth
rate of 3 percent per annum in equation (61) by choosing A = B = D = 1.973.
Table 4: Welfare Effects of Taxes (with and without home production)
β = 0.998, σ = 1, A = B = D = 1.973, α = φ = θ = 0.36, δ = δH = 1, s = 0
welfare with home welfare without home
production production
γ = 0.23,  = 0.22 γ = 0.449,  = 0.001
τc = 0, τl = 0, τk = 0 264.417+constant 415.629+constant
τc = 0, τl = 0.01, τk = 0 -28.960+constant 120.954+constant
τc = 0, τl = 0, τk = 0.01 148.399+constant 299.206+constant
τc = 0.01, τl = 0, τk = 0 264.409+constant 415.615+constant
constant= 225 lnK0 + 187 lnh0
From Table 4, we can see that welfare is negatively related to each of the three
taxes in both cases with and without home production. The taxes have both
growth and level effects on welfare. The growth effects have been explained
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in the previous subsection. The level effects come from the fact that all the
three distortionary taxes lead to suboptimal equilibrium values of the model’s
variables.
Table 5: Welfare Effects of Taxes: The Role of Home Production
Welfare’s change with Welfare’s change without
home production home production
τl : 0→ 0.01 −168.14% −70.90%
τk : 0→ 0.01 −43.88% −28.01%
τc : 0→ 0.01 −0.00335% −0.00328%
K0 = H0 = h0 = 1
Again, in both cases with and without home production, τl reduces welfare
most, followed by τk, and τc the least. Such sequence coincides with that in
the growth effects analysis, and hence the reasons could be very similar to those
explained in growth effects subsection: the way we choose to parameterize the
(physical) capital share in all three productions ensure that τl would incur
the largest welfare cost among these three taxes for equal percentage change
of tax rate. Especially, that the intensity of effective labor supply in market
goods production, namely (1− α), is chosen to be larger than 0.5 is the main
reason why labor income tax has the largest negative impact on welfare. The
special case condition σ = 1, δ = 1, however, does not determine the ranking
of the negative impacts of each tax, but it may alter the magnitude of each
tax distortion within this ranking.
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Nevertheless, it is fairly surprising to find out that with home production, all
taxes drag down the welfare more significantly. This finding opposes our previ-
ous result in growth effects of taxation, where with home production, taxes do
not affect growth rate too dramatically. Why does this home production buffer
advantage in growth effect disappear in welfare effect? It may be because that:
when tax increases, the economy is not only subject to the growth effect, but
to level effect as well. The parameterization we opt may cause the following
result: with home production, the total level effect may be so severe that it
dominates the home production buffer advantage in growth effect. In other
words, with home production, even if growth rate is less affected by taxes, but
due to the severity of the level effect, all three taxes reduce welfare more. This
idea of level effect dominance is also supported by Table 4, in which all welfare
values are lower when home production is significant in the economy.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has analytically and numerically explored the effects of various
taxes on growth and welfare in a two-sector endogenous growth model with
and without home production. The study has shown that in an economy with
or without home production, all these taxes reduce the growth rate, with the
labor income tax reducing the growth rate most, the capital income tax sec-
ond, and the consumption tax least. Then we compare the magnitudes of the
growth effects of taxes in economies with and without home production. It
is shown that if there exists home production sector, the steady-state growth
rate will be less responsive to each of the three taxes. It is because that home
production plays an important role as a buffer to absorb the shocks of the tax
policies.
We also show that the taxes have negative effects on welfare regardless of
whether there exists home production. In terms of the welfare costs, for equal
percentage changes, the labor income tax has the highest cost, the consumption
tax has the lowest cost and the capital income tax is in between. By compar-
ing the scenarios with and without home production, we find that when home
production is present, each of the taxes has a larger welfare cost.
The findings in this thesis may contribute to the understanding of how tax
policies affect growth and welfare in a real world where home production ac-
counts for a large share of production activities. Since the real world economy
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is closer to the economy with home production, the findings in this thesis may
be useful for the policymakers in the real world. For example, the policymak-
ers should be more cautious when they use the labor income tax to finance
the government spending, since the negative impacts of it on growth rate are
very large. Especially when we take welfare costs into account, it is more dis-
couraged to use labor income tax, due to the fact that in the economy with
home production, an increase in labor income tax harms welfare terribly. It is
also suggested that government should rely on consumption tax more when fi-
nancing the government spending, since it is less distortionary. These findings
confirm the growth and welfare effects of taxation in the previous endogenous
growth literatures, and the theoretical results of such literatures also apply to
the economy with home production.
Nevertheless, the thesis still has room to improve: it does not analytically
examine the growth and welfare effects of taxation. Instead, the main results
are based on numerical examples. And the thesis only focuses on the analysis
of growth effects of taxation in the steady state and welfare effects in a special
case. Besides, it does not consider the equal-revenue changes of taxes. But this
research still suggests a possible way to deepen our understanding of taxation
policies by introducing home production into the model.
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